Rod Rees to Piet Hut
Piet,
Your question about
consciousness is important. Let me comment on your three definitions,
which are
all relevant depending on what point of view (i.e., context) you want
to take.
1) what the brain
produces, in a world that is
fundamentally given in terms of matter & energy in space & time
In the context of
science
"that which neurophysiology sees my brain doing" and "that which
I experience as consciousness" are isomorphic. I have no problem with
isomorphism between brain & consciousness, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF
SCIENCE.
The alternative that consciousness is a "spirit" which is independent
of the brain (or as Arthur Koestler said, "a ghost in the machine")
brings up far more problems than it solves.
However,
"looking at my brain"
is a radically different enterprise than "experiencing
consciousness." Even though there is isomorphism between what happens
in
the brain and what appears in consciousness, the quality of the two
ways of
observing is radically different. Watching a neuron in the occipital
cortex
respond to a wavelength of 475 nm is qualitatively different from
experiencing
the color "blue." Which brings us to...
2) what
is phenomenologically given, prior to
physical matter and energy
This version
gets us a bit
closer to the reality of consciousness. Consciousness comes first, from
which
we concoct a material world to fit our experience. This is the
Cartesian Cogito which posits
that my consciousness is my only
indubitable reality. This is a legitimate version of consciousness, but
only
WITHIN A LIMITED CONTEXT. The Cartesian Cogito
suffers from making material reality a mere derivative of
consciousness. It's a
good place to start but it doesn't go far enough. So we're led to...
3)
something that goes beyond even the
subject-object split, that is still in place in a typical
phenomenological
analysis
In my view,
the subject-object
split is nothing but a linguistic inconvenience. Subject (I) and object
(the
World) are merely different ways of communicating reality. There is no
separation between I & World in any sense other than the way I talk
about
my experiences. It makes no sense to have a consciousness that exists
independently of the world, nor a world that is independent of
consciousness.
So what I
mean by consciousness
is "all of that by which I am me." Consciousness entails all that I
have been, and it admits all that I could be. Thus, consciousness
unfolds in
the here & now as the thin edge between what-I-have-been &
what-I-could-be.
I think this view of consciousness is exactly what Longchenpa called
"naturally occurring timeless awareness." So, in exploring the
working hypothesis, I'll be happy using the word "consciousness" or
any other word that captures the same sense I've described here, if
that suits
you as well.
What, then,
do "time"
and "timelessness" mean in terms of consciousness? How do we commonly
experience time? And how could we portray the experience of
timelessness?
Rod