Rod,
I agree that the third definition of
consciousness is the most fruitful, so let us see what we can say about
that. The
problem in a discussion about consciousness is that our cultural
heritage has
very few precise terms about consciousness: even such basic words like
mind or
soul are used in such different ways by different people in different
contexts.
What do we
mean with consciousness beyond a
subject-object split? Let me try to give some lived
examples,
from my own experience.
1) I am
absorbed in reading a novel or
working on a mathematical problem. In either case, I am not
consciously aware
of my presence as a subject. It feels as if I have `fallen into' the
novel or the math puzzle.
2) I am
watching a beautiful sunset, or listening
to a wonderful piece of music, in such a way that I am `carried away'
by it
with a sense of elation; words like epiphany or euphoria might be
appropriate.
3) I am
walking on the street, and
gradually all sense of worry and effort `drop away' and I am left with
a sense
of the freedom of not-doing, wu-wei. I still walk and
breathe and look around,
but with hardly an actor left.
4) I am
sitting in a park, watching
children play and leaves fall, and a sense of timelessness `comes over'
me, a
stillness that leaves everything so thin, so thin, ethereal yet vividly
intimate, in an immediate presence.
For me,
those four examples already show
very different ways in which the usual subject-object separation can be
progressively deemphasized, and I could list many more. I wonder how we
can try
to form a common language to talk about such differences. To cover all
of them
with a blanket description `consciousness beyond subject-object split'
would
beg the question of further, more precise distinctions.
In physics,
for example, we can talk about
motion, using terms like velocity and acceleration and momentum and
kinetic
energy. Each of those terms have very precise meaning, and together
they allow
us to analyze and discuss various phenomena dealing with motion.
I wonder
whether it is possible to do
something similar with consciousness.
As in
physics, we probably should start
with lab experiments, and then introduce more theoretical terms while
staying
close to experiments. In our case, our lives can be our labs.
Would you
like to describe some examples
from your experience, concerning cases of consciousness in which
subject and
objects were less pronounced?
Piet